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Abstract –The complexity of modern 
products, systems and processes makes the 
task to identify, characterise and provide 
sufficient assurance about the desirable 
properties a major challenge. Stakeholders 
also, demand a degree of enhanced confidence 
about the absence of undesirable properties 
with a potential to cause harm or loss. The 
paper develops a framework of seven 
fundamental facets of performance as an 
ontology for emergent behavioural properties 
and a separate framework for the emergent 
structural properties of complex systems. The 
emergent behavioural aspects are explored 
and we develop a systems framework for 
assurance based on an Assessment and 
Management paradigm each comprising a 
number of principles and processes. The key 
argument advanced is that in the face of 
complexity and incessant change, enhanced 
confidence in the achievement of desirable and 
avoidance of undesirable properties requires a 
systems approach empowered by suitable 
modelling and relevant diagnostic tools 
explaining the nature of emergent properties. 
The principal focus of this paper is on safety, 
security and sustainability emergent 
behavioural (performance) aspects of complex 
products, systems and processes.  
Keywords: Safety, Security, Complexity 
Sustainability, Assurance, Systems Approach  
 
I. Introduction 
Amongst many challenges arising from the 
pervasive complexity in most modern products, 
systems and processes is the necessity to 
identify, characterise and provide sufficient 
assurance about the desirable properties. 
Alongside this, most key stakeholders, 
specifically the regulators and end users, 
demand a similar degree of enhanced 
confidence about the absence of undesirable 
properties often with a potential to cause harm 
or loss, for such products, systems or processes. 
We develop and propose a framework of seven 
fundamental facets of performance as an 
ontology for emergent behavioural properties 
and a separate framework for the emergent 
structural properties in complex and/or large 
scale system of systems. Understanding and 
managing complexity, as well as characterising 
structure are central to this work. The need for 
conceptualisation, analysis, assessment and 
enhanced confidence in the properties of 
complex systems, specifically the emergent 
behavioural aspects is subsequently explored 
where we develop and propose a systems 
framework for assurance based on an 
Assessment and Management paradigm each 
comprising a number of principles and 
processes. The key argument advanced is that 
in the face of complexity and incessant change, 
enhanced confidence in the achievement of 
desirable and avoidance of undesirable 
properties itself requires a systems approach, 
supported by appropriate modelling tools and 
diagnostics. These are needed to understand 
the nature of emergent properties as features of 
aggregation in complex processes and thus 
help us to avoid making erroneous decisions 
with costly and sometimes irreversible 
consequences. The principal focus of this 
paper is on safety, security and sustainability 
emergent behavioural (performance) aspects of 
complex products, systems and processes, but 
the framework has more general validity.  
 
II. Complexity and Emergent 
Properties  
Complex Systems is the term that emerges in 
many disciplines and domains and has many 
interpretations, implications and problems 
associated with it. The specific domain 
provides dominant features and characterise 
the nature of problems to be considered. A 
very significant class of complexity issues is 
that linked to design and operation of 
industrial systems. The distinguishing features 
of this area is the close link between modelling, 
system structure and properties, measurement-
information and control-decision making-
management structures which requires a 
systems framework.  
 
Systems complexity is multidimensional and 
progressing beyond the stage of problem 
  
conceptualization is a challenge. In this paper 
our interest is focused on aspects of systems 
performance. Much akin to most products and 
systems, the performance of complex systems 
is a measure of their utility, output and 
perceived or real emergent properties. The key 
facets to a general system’s properties can be 
summarized as; 
• Characterisation and Management of 
Complexity; 
• Emergent structural properties; 
• Emergent behavioural properties. 
 
Problem complexity is manifested in many 
different ways which include: 
 
(a) Lack of knowledge, or difficulties in 
characterising the behaviour of the basic 
process (Unit Behavioural Complexity). 
(b) Complexity of computational engines 
(Computational Complexity). 
(c)  Difficulties in characterising the 
interconnection topology of sub-
processes and/or variability, uncertainty 
of this topology during the system 
lifecycle (Interconnection Topology 
Complexity). 
(d)  Large scale dimensionality (Large Scale 
Complexity) 
(e) Heterogeneous nature of sub-processes, 
resulting in hybrid forms of behaviour 
(Hybrid Behavioural Complexity). 
(f) Organisational alternatives for the 
functioning, information and decision 
making (control) structures in respond to 
goals and operational requirements 
(Organisational Complexity). 
(g) Variability and/or uncertainty on the 
system’s environment during the 
lifecycle requiring flexibility in 
organisation (Lifecycle Complexity). 
 
Emergent properties is a term referred to 
aggregate aspects of behaviour of the system 
properties. Frequently, such properties are 
linked to specific metrics defined by the 
system variables. The emergent behavioural 
properties of complex systems comprise an 
ontology of seven often context sensitive 
facets namely: (1) Technical functionality; (2) 
Cost; (3) Environmental behaviours & 
Sustainability; (4) Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability; (5) Safety & Security; (6) 
Quality; (7) Perceived Value. 
 
The above emergent behavioural properties or 
facets of performance are reasonably distinct 
and often inter-related thus posing a major 
challenge to designers, and duty holders to 
arrive at optimum solutions which satisfy 
stakeholders’ expectations on each dimension. 
The evaluation of the degree of presence, or 
absence of these properties and the nature of 
interrelationships between them is an open 
problem that frequently depends on the nature 
of the specific system.  One key distinction 
between these emergent properties is the fact 
that apart from safety and increasingly 
security and environmental performance, 
which are subject to a regulatory framework in 
most societies, the desirable level for the rest 
of these properties e.g. cost, reliability, quality 
etc. are left to the discretion of the duty 
holders and market forces. This therefore 
creates a legal compliance issue for attaining 
and assuring certain characteristics as well as 
deliver the corporate social responsibility. 
The key differentiation between safety and 
security performance in cybernetic systems is 
broadly as follows; safety is freedom from 
harm to people caused by unintentional or 
random/systematic errors and failures of a 
product, process, system or mission whilst 
security is freedom from loss caused by 
deliberate acts perpetrated by people. 
Therefore security is principally characterised 
by intent and nature of causation as opposed to 
strictly being an output performance indicator 
reflecting degrees of loss or gain. Like safety 
performance, security of a system is mainly 
measured probabilistically in terms of risk due 
to inherent uncertainties. For simplicity, we 
deliberately exclude the so called natural 
causes or acts of god, in this analysis. 
The security of general systems is often 
forecast and measured in terms of perceived or 
real threats and vulnerabilities and not in terms 
of consequential risk of harm and loss 
however. The threat is often an external source 
of malicious intent whereas vulnerability is an 
inherent flaw/dysfunction in a system making 
it prone to external and sometimes internal 
threats. Whatever the shortcomings on both 
aspects of safety and security performance, 
there’s a discernible lack of systemic approach 
in identification, assessment and management 
of such risks in most enterprises and 
endeavors. This paper develops an systemic 
framework for assurance of safety, security 
and potentially sustainability in complex 
systems whilst proposing an innovative set of 
performance criteria for these critical facets of 
performance. 
  
III. Systems Safety & Security,       
the Fundamentals 
A. System Safety Concepts 
The classical view of safety performance in 
hard and soft systems [5] is often biased 
towards historical accidents and often feeble 
post mortem attempts at understanding the 
causation and prevention or avoidance of 
similar causes. This deficient and primordial 
paradigm is challenged on the grounds that: 
 
• Same accident may arise from a 
multiplicity of different causative factors; 
• Accident investigations are predominately 
driven by legal imperatives and the need 
for finding a responsible person/body as 
opposed to the systemic understanding of 
the underlying root causes; 
• Increasing pace of change, innovation and 
complexity in modern systems creates 
opportunities for new forms of accidents as 
yet un-encountered; 
• The social, legal and organizational costs 
associated with accidents are constantly on 
the rise in view of the increasing public 
awareness, regulation and the litigation 
process. 
 
It is argued therefore that allowing accidents to 
happen and the subsequent often inconclusive 
and feeble attempts at investigation and 
learning is tantamount to negligence and 
admission of failure in the face of challenges 
and risks faced. A new advanced paradigm 
based on credible and objective scientific 
principles is needed to counter the formidable 
risks posed by modern innovations, complex 
undertakings/missions and discoveries.  
(1) The Systems Approach to Safety  
In view of the major shortcomings of the 
dysfunctional classical accident focused 
approach cited above, the systems approach to 
specification, realisation and management of 
safe and secure systems is founded on the 
identification of hazardous states, generally 
precursors to accidents. This generates a 
deeper insight in complex systems and can 
expose a vast array of faults, errors, failures 
and vulnerabilities which individually or in 
combination lead to the realisation of 
hazardous states. Likewise, a hazard focused 
approach provides the opportunity to 
objectively scrutinise the potential escalation 
scenarios associated with a hazard and devise 
potent solutions to detect, contain, control or 
mitigate the broad range of accidents which 
may arise from such states in a general system.  
 
In sharp contrast to the reactive learning from 
accidents, the systems approach to safety 
assurance principally focuses on empirical as 
well as creative identification of hazards. Once 
a suite of key hazardous states are proactively 
identified and ranked, it explores their causes, 
random or systematic [7], scrutinises their 
escalation scenarios and devises risk control 
and mitigation strategies [1]. Crucial for this 
approach is the need for a general systems 
framework that defines the relevant states. 
(2) The Need for System Safety Metrics 
Safety is a human focused concept reflecting 
the degree of freedom from unacceptable harm 
to people. Paradoxically, it is often measured 
by its absence for example, the safety of 
products, processes, systems and missions is 
regularly quoted in terms of risk of harm they 
may cause/entail to specific groups as opposed 
to the expected duration of harm free 
operation akin to reliability! The other fallacy 
is to forecast the safety of a complex system 
principally based on the empirical or past 
performance of similar systems, a notion 
which relates to random rather than systematic 
causes of hazards  naively assuming that the 
future is a simple (linear) evolution of the past. 
Safety is predominately measured in terms of 
risk which is a forecast comprising the 
likelihood/frequency of an accident and the 
degree of loss that it may entail. This poses a 
challenge to many duty holders or system 
designers who find it difficult if not 
impossible to relate the faults and failures of 
their products or systems to likely injuries and 
fatalities to the end users. To this end, some 
system standards [7] have advocated hazard 
rates as a direct measure of system safety, 
leading to the classification of system’s safety 
properties in terms of Safety Integrity Level 
(SIL). The SIL concept which has a 
widespread following in the industry is more 
akin to a reliability perspective and is a non-
systemic convention without much regard to 
the consequences of the so called dangerous 
failures [9]. 
Some sector standards, strangely derivatives 
of the IEC system standard [7], such as those 
for safety critical transport [8] advocate 
Tolerable Hazard Rates (THR), taking into 
account a total systemic perspective and the 
notion of tolerability of risk. There’s a need 
for systemic metrics which go beyond failure 
and additionally take into account exposure of 
  
various groups at risk as well as the potential 
escalation scenarios and tolerability criteria 
[17]. The THR concept which is principally 
reliant on historical performance of systems 
goes a fair way towards this ideal but fails to 
explicitly address all requisite factors in one 
cogent metric.  
Whatever the approach, there’s a need for a 
portfolio of systemic lead as well as lag 
indicators for safety, security and 
sustainability of complex cybernetic systems. 
We will address this issue further in this paper. 
B. System Security Concepts 
Unlike safety, security has many different 
interpretations and contextual implications for 
its stakeholders. From a systems perspective, 
security is lack of susceptibility to malicious 
intent which may comprise; (i) Vandalism; (ii) 
Sabotage; (iii) Theft and fraudulent gain; (iv) 
Terrorism; or a combination thereof. Whatever 
the context, security or lack of it is principally 
characterized by the intent on causing harm 
therefore, it is currently at least, a mostly 
human focused issue. However, in the 
cybernetics domain, this may eventually 
become a concern between autonomous 
intelligent systems without direct human 
intervention in spite of the three laws of 
robotics as laid down by Asimov [6]. 
(1) The Systems Approach to Security 
There are two fundamental facets to security 
of a general system. The extrinsic dimension 
or driver is threat, characterized by the real or 
perceived existence of people or systems with 
intention to cause harm and loss. The intrinsic 
dimension or counterpart is vulnerability. In 
this spirit, whilst threats are diverse and 
unlikely to be fully forecast, anticipated or 
controlled, vulnerabilities are characteristics of 
a general system (cybernetic or otherwise), 
which arise from lack of awareness to 
potential for harm from threats in the larger 
environment of operation. Frequently, 
vulnerability may be characterized as a 
structural system property linked to 
interconnection topology, or some system 
functionality with a critical role, or linked to 
external to the system factors (external 
influences). Defining system vulnerability in 
concrete terms requires diagnostics and an 
appropriate methodology. 
 
In a synergistic manner to systems safety 
assurance cited earlier, the main thrust of 
systems security assurance therefore rests 
upon systematic identification of key 
vulnerabilities, analysis of the causations and 
potential escalation scenarios and evaluation 
of pertinent risks. This is followed by 
proactive development of elimination or 
control strategies for major vulnerabilities and 
identification of detection, containment or 
mitigation solutions in the event of realisation 
of threats. However, in a similar manner to the 
systems safety related precursors (hazards), 
vulnerabilities as an intrinsic facet of a 
system’s architecture or operation are mostly a 
concern at the system boundary. A further 
elaboration of this may lead to the 
consideration of internal and external threats 
and vulnerabilities with major implications for 
systems security which is beyond the scope of 
the current debate. In Systems of systems 
(SoS) or large open systems with significant 
degree of vulnerabilities, security is often 
assured through focus on threats rather than 
vulnerabilities. However, combined treatment 
of the intrinsic and extrinsic facets of the 
system are preferred where practicable. 
(2)The Need for System Security Metrics  
Bearing in mind the extrinsic and intrinsic 
facets, it is instructive to identify, quantify and 
treat threats and vulnerabilities collectively to 
ensure completeness and coverage of key 
concerns. Threat as an extrinsic measure for a 
system’s security is generally classed into a 
number of distinct levels. The US Department 
of Homeland Security defines five Threat 
Conditions, each identified by a description 
and corresponding colour. From lowest to 
highest, the levels and colours are:  
(a) Low = Green; (b) Guarded = Blue; (c) 
Elevated = Yellow; (d) High = Orange; (e) 
Severe = Red.  
However, these are principally threat criteria 
relating to terrorism. The higher the Threat 
Condition or index, the greater the risk of a 
terrorist attack where risk includes both the 
probability of an attack occurring and its 
potential losses. 
In a similar manner to the threats, metrics are 
called for systems vulnerabilities since these 
render a system susceptible to damage and 
harm, even in the absence of malicious intent 
at the outset. Even though the safety concept 
of SIL is not truly indicative of safety 
properties of a complex system [9], it is more 
appropriate for measurement of vulnerability 
since this is an intrinsic (architectural, 
compositional and operational) system 
  
property. A credible metric for a cybernetic 
system’s vulnerability would provide an 
objective measure of its resilience against 
potential threats. This could be a System 
Resilience Index which needs to be elaborated 
and quantified for various classes of 
vulnerability. 
C. System Sustainability Concepts 
(1) The Systems Approach to Sustainability 
Sustainability is a high level emergent system 
property that expresses the ability of the 
system to survive and continue to function 
according to the original goals set for its 
operation. It is thus related to :  
(i) Robustness of the system behaviour to 
external disturbances ;  
(ii) Ability to overcome threats that may have 
catastrophic consequences by demonstrating 
capabilities to survive and achieve the central 
goal ;  
(iii) Adaptability by demonstrating capability 
to reorgonise its control and information 
structures after some catastrophic events, or 
changes in the operational goals of the system 
due to changes in the market ; 
(iv) Potential for the system to evolve in a  
continuously changing environment of goals, 
specifications and constraints. 
 
In principle, apart from survivability and 
résilience attributes, sustainability possesses 
social, economic and enviornmental 
dimensions as well, making it a complex 
composite property in its own right. It is clear 
therefore that the basic concepts required to 
define sustainability are themselves emergent 
system properties and it is this that makes 
sustainability a higher level emergent property. 
(2) The Need for System Sustainability 
Metrics 
Defining sustainability as an emergent higher 
level, or composite property implies that we 
need to: (i) Identify the constituent (primitive) 
emergent properties. (ii) Develop diagnostics 
for characterising and evaluating the primitive 
emergent properties. (iii) Develop a coneptual 
system framework expressing sustainability as 
composition, aggregation of simple-primitive 
emergent properties. (iv) Develop a meta-
model expressing this aggregation and 
enabling the evaluation-measurement of 
sustainability. 
 
Developing metrics for sustainability is a 
challenging problem that has to address all 
issues described above. The difficulties are due 
to the characterisation of primitive emergent 
properties in terms that may be quantified, as 
well as expressing the composition in a way 
that supports the development of composite 
metrics. These tasks are beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
 
IV. Systems Safety, Security and 
Sustainability Assurance : the 
Framework 
We propose two complementary and advanced 
sets of systems principles and processes as the 
underpinning backbone to tackling the 
challenges of safety, security and potentially 
sustainability in products, processes, systems 
and undertakings. Taking a life-cycle 
perspective [12] these comprise I & III below; 
(i) Assessment: This comprises recognising 
the need, defining the system, specifying and 
identifying/understanding of key    properties, 
behaviours, hazards and vulnerabilities, 
evaluating and assessing expected impact;  
(ii) Realisation: This is ultimately aimed 
realising the desirable properties and achieving 
the desired performance in the form of product, 
process, system, mission or undertaking; 
(iii) Management: this comprises taking the 
outcome of assessment and realisation into 
consideration and ensuring deployment, 
delivery of requisite performance, continued 
monitoring and control through a responsive 
and holistic suite of strategies, resources and 
actions. 
Whilst Realisation is specific to a given 
domain and context, the Assessment and 
Management aspects as a suite of principles 
constitute a meta-knowledge framework which 
can be abstracted and developed for almost 
universal application across many domains and 
disciplines. The systemic framework of 
assessment and management is equally 
applicable and effective within the context of 
desirable as well as undesirable properties of 
products, systems and endeavours. This is 
contrary to the current conventional wisdom 
where specification, delivery and continual 
monitoring of desirable aspects of performance 
is regarded as an essentially domain expertise 
where as the undesirable and unintended 
emergent properties (hazards and 
vulnerabilities) are the forte of so called risk 
management. The +Safe3 extension [11] to the 
renowned CMMi model [14] also distinguishes 
between Safety Engineering & Safety 
Management, which are mainly synonymous 
  
with Risk Assessment and Risk Management 
advocated here.  
 
Whilst presented as a dual and complementary 
suite of principles and processes, assessment 
and management are iterative and systemic in 
the sense that processes inherent in the 
management framework employ assessment 
activities at requisite points to support 
judicious decision making and ensuring 
optimal performance. These are collectively 
referred to as Systems Assurance and labeled 
as Surety Framework in this paper. 
 
A. Risk Assessment 
This key facet of Surety framework depicted 
in Fig. 1 is proposed as a backbone to the 
identification, specification, evaluation and 
assessment of the undesirable events or 
properties adversely affecting technical 
functionality, cost, reliability, safety, quality 
etc. The risk assessment process [13] 
comprises seven systemic aspects such as: (a) 
Hazard Identification; (b) Causal Analysis; (c) 
Consequence Analysis; (d) Loss Analysis; (e) 
Options Analysis; (f) Impact Analysis; (g) 
Demonstration of Compliance. 
The risk assessment process, whilst systematic 
and comprehensive, is aimed at enhancing the 
systemic understanding of the key issues and 
is not treated as an end in itself. Assessment 
process generates transparency and awareness 
of real and potential issues thus empowering 
the duty holders to take appropriate actions 
and make the transition from fire fighting and 
reactivity to anticipation and proactivity. 
B. Risk Management 
A holistic and systemic approach to assurance 
of safety and security properties of generic 
products, processes, systems or undertakings 
is developed and proposed in a major paper 
[4]. The paper elaborates seven principles 
which have to be collectively fulfilled before 
sufficient assurance is gained and maintained 
in the desirable safety and security properties 
of a general or cybernetic system. 
This complementary aspect of assurance 
within the Surety Framework comprises an 
advanced and systematic approach to 
developing, sustaining, enhancing and 
managing the so called downside events and 
properties associated with any complex 
product, process, system or undertaking. Risk 
management builds upon the outcome of 
systematic assessment and ensures the 
identified and prioritized risks are eliminated, 
mitigated or continually controlled in a 
comprehensive and responsive manner. The 
risk management process is depicted in Fig. 2. 
The proposed systems suite of principles 
demands a thorough and structured scrutiny of 
the problem domain as the key stage in 
safety/security assurance followed by a 
number of complementary and value added 
activities. The principles underpinning the 
systemic and holistic management of safety 
and security are; 
(1) Proactivity; (2) Prevention; (3) Protection 
& Containment; (4) Preparedness & Response; 
(5) Recovery & Restoration; (6) Organization 
& Learning; (7) Continual Enhancement. 
The nature and essential aspects of the 
principles are detailed in the published paper 
[4]. However, the suite of seven principles is 
equally applicable to cybernetic systems in 
which, in view of the complexity (spatial or 
temporal or both) or novelty, assurance is 
mainly derived from the quality of the process 
and competencies of those involved. 
C. Application of the Framework 
 The systemic framework of assessment 
and management proposed here is applicable 
to the attainment, maintenance and continual 
enhancement of three key and increasingly 
regulated aspects of safety, security and the 
environmental performance/sustainability of 
general and cybernetic systems.  
Nano-technology poses a modern and 
innovative domain where the safety and 
indeed security and the environmental 
implications of its products and offerings are 
largely unknown even by purveyors of the 
relevant products and services. An illustrative 
case involves the marketing of cosmetics 
containing nano-particles [10]. Because of 
their far smaller size, these particles are 
absorbed deeper into epidermis, dermis, cells 
and eventually into the blood stream of the 
users. The significant uncertainty on the risks 
has led to calls from the UK Royal Society 
and the US Federal Drug Administration 
(FDA) for a comprehensive research 
programme into the likely effects. In the mean 
time, the cosmetics industry considers nano-
particles a “hot technology” with lots of 
intriguing applications, allocating vast sums to 
research into nano-technology. The FDA 
maintains that urgent research is called for due 
to the paucity of the knowledge on the effects 
  
of the nano-particles when they enter cells in 
the human body or leach into the blood 
stream. A systemic framework constitutes a 
potent weapon in the face of such huge 
uncertainties with major implications for the 
human society at large. 
The seven underpinning principles for risk 
management can be mapped to the 
requirements of any domain at any level of 
abstraction or details namely: (i) Industry / 
Sector; (ii) Corporate / Organization; (iii) 
Division / Team; (iv) Project / Product; (v) 
Mission. The scalable architecture for 
application of the proposed surety framework 
at macro (society/corporate) and micro 
(system/product) levels would entail: 
(a) Identification of key influencing factors for 
each one of the seven principles and 
generation of a hierarchical network/model for 
such factors depicting their roles and 
relationships [2]; 
(b) Assessment and quantification of these 
networks and generation of an overall 
numerical index for each principle in the 
framework [3]; 
(c) Generation of a combined figure of merit 
(System Integrity and Resilience Index-SIRI) 
for the whole generic or cybernetic system 
under consideration, based on the seven 
indices derived for each principle. 
Such indices can be benchmarked against 
desirable or tolerable levels of safety, security 
and environmental performance thus 
providing a reference level for the optimal 
assurance under each individual principle as 
well as the whole framework applied to a 
system. This generates an advanced, focused 
and responsive system for attainment, 
management and continual enhancement of 
safety and security properties at the pertinent 
application level. 
V. Conclusions 
Amongst the seven key facets of a system’s 
performance cited earlier, the safety, security 
and the environmental/global aspects are 
increasingly regulated by governments 
[17,19]. This is partly driven by the gradual 
enhancement in the quality of life and public’s 
awareness and demand for a more socially 
responsible stance by duty holders; private and 
public corporations, service providers and the 
suppliers. One of the striking observations in 
the fields of safety, security and environmental 
assurance is the overt reliance on often 
parochial technical solutions at the expense of 
a systemic and holistic understanding of the 
key issues and domain requirements.  
Cybernetic systems driven by complexity, 
novelty and increasing pace of change and 
progression pose a challenge in safety and 
security if not environmental assurance due to 
inherent uncertainties. In such settings, the 
adoption of a systemic framework of universal 
principles assists with enhanced confidence in 
emergent properties where otherwise 
significant uncertainties prevail.  
The proper development of the field requires a 
suitable abstract systems framework that can 
explain and provide model based tools and 
diagnostics for emergent system properties. 
This is crucial for the development of metrics 
that can characterize primitive and composite 
emergent properties. Metrics may provide 
characterization of such properties. Linking 
emergent properties to system structure is 
critical, if we are to address issues of re-
engineering of systems and processes aiming 
for development of systems with improved 
desirable properties, or reduced risks. 
Reengineering for improved systems 
assurance is an area where future research has 
to develop. Such efforts, however, require an 
appropriate systems framework [15], [16] that 
can support analysis and design by following 
paths similar to those deployed for hard 
systems.   
We have developed and proposed an 
integrated framework comprising assessment 
and management paradigms labeled as Surety. 
However, whilst the current focus has been the 
avoidance or minimization of risks, Surety 
framework additionally encompasses 
performance optimization not addressed here. 
Such systemic assurance frameworks are 
instrumental in holistic identification, 
classification and treatment of critical issues 
(hazards and vulnerabilities) and the 
specification/adoption of pertinent solutions. 
Founded in systems theory and embodying a 
significant structural, empirical and scientific 
knowledge, they also assist with the evaluation 
of the effectiveness of the risk control options 
whilst exposing gaps in the overall landscape 
and strategy. In view of the synergies between 
safety and security facets of performance, 
adoption of one integrated framework would 
result in savings on time and effort whilst 
optimising investment in equipment and 
systems. They are the most potent weapon in 




Increasing confidence and certainty 
Gain: Lives saved, improvements made, 
damages prevented or avoided in the 
natural habitat or benefits accrued to a 
business/society or a combination 
thereof. The expected value of a 
future benefit. 
Hazard: Object, state or condition which in the 
absence of adequate detection or 
containment could lead to an accident. 
Health: Soundness of body and mind, 
freedom from illness 
Loss:  Physical harm to people, detriment to 
a business/society or 
damage/destruction of the natural 
habitat or a combination thereof. 
Reward: A forecast for a desirable event or 
gain. 
Risk:  A forecast for an accident or loss. The 
expected value of a future loss.  
System:  A (purposeful) composite of inter-
related parts / elements with 
discernible collective output(s) or 
emergent property(ies) not manifested 
by any of the elements. 
Safety:  Freedom of people from (physical) 
harm. 
Security: 
Freedom from vulnerability or loss 
caused by deliberate and malicious 
acts. 
Sustainability: 
 A blend of social, economic and 
environmental considerations which 
render a product, system or 
undertaking viable and continually 
optimal. 
Systems Assurance: 
 The art, science and technology of 
ensuring and demonstrating that a 
system is likely to achieve its 
objectives without engendering 
unacceptable levels of loss. 
Systems Safety: 
 The art, science and technology of 
ensuring and demonstrating that a 
system is not likely to lead to 
unacceptable levels of (physical) 
harm to people. 
Systems Security: 
 The art, science and technology of 
ensuring and demonstrating that a 
system is not likely to be vulnerable 
to malicious deliberate acts aimed at 





Susceptibility to injury, fatality or 
loss. 
Welfare: Well being and quality of life for 
individuals and the society. 
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